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Comecon 
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was given fresh impetus by the 
challenge of integration in Western Europe. Eastern European cooperation is 
compared with integration in Western Europe. Finally there is the question of 
how to reform Comecon to align it with the present movement of economic reform 
in Eastern Europe. 
The origins 
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known as 
"CMEA" or, more commonly, "Comecon", was founded in 
January 1949 by the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Albania joined in April 
1949 and East Germany in September 1950. In May 1956 
Communist China and Yugoslavia became "observers", 
North Korea and North Vietnam following them in 1957. 
Yugoslavia withdrew in 1958 and did not renew its associa-
tion as an observer until 1964. China, North Korea and 
North Vietnam gradually withdrew after 1960 when the 
Sino-Soviet dispute came into the open. Albania, which 
supported the Chinese in the quarrel, withdrew abruptly in 
1961. In 1962 Outer Mongolia was admitted to, and still 
retains, full membership. 
The purpose of Comecon as defined in Article I of the 
Statutes adopted in 1960 is "by uniting and co-ordinating 
the efforts of the member countries" to promote the deve-
lopment of the national economy and the acceleration of 
economic and technical progress in the member states; the 
acceleration of industrialization in the less developed 
member states, an increase in the productivity of labour 
and an improvement in the welfare of the peoples of the 
member states. The Article goes on to say that "the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is established on 
the basis of the sovereign equality of all the member 
countries of the Council". 
Comparison with the EEC 
Although the general aim of promoting economic welfare 
as set out in the Comecon Statutes is similar to that of the 
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EEC as set out in the Treaty of Rome (defined in Article 2 
of the Treaty as being "to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, 
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and close 
relations between its member states") there is an important 
difference between the method proposed to achieve the 
desired end. Whereas the Treaty of Rome provides for 
the gradual establishment of a Common Market within 
which common policies will be accepted by the member 
states and many of the functions of economic management 
progressively assigned to common institutions, the Statutes 
of Comecon go no further than to authorize the Council 
to organize cooperation between the member states and to 
recommend joint measures in specified fields of activity. 
This is essentially a difference between integration and 
co-operation. 
It may appear paradoxical that the "authoritarian" states 
of Eastern Europe should adopt a system so much more 
"permissive" than that adopted by the six democratic West 
European States, but the Statutes of Comecon assume that 
the member states, under the rule of Communist Parties, 
are already in effect politically integrated and that for this 
reason they will find no difficulty in voluntary cooperation 
in economic and technical matters. This assumption is in 
fact too optimistic; the institutional structure of Comecon 
is not strong enough to implement proposals for integration 
or even for cooperation against the will of the member 
states. The Council, the supreme directing body, is com-
posed of comparatively junior ministers from the member 
states; when major policy decisions are to be taken special 
meetings of senior government and party officials, not 
forming part of the Comecon organization itself, have to be 
arranged. The Council of Comecon has neither the status 
nor the powers of the Council of Ministers of the EEC. 

The institutions 
The headquarters office of Comecon is in Moscow. The 
Council 1, composed of Vice-Premiers, Ministers of Foreign 
Trade, Chairmen of State Planning Commissions of the 
member states or persons of comparable rank, is required 
to meet at least once a year in each of the capitals of the 
member states in rotation. Since 1962 there has been an 
Executive Committee to maintain the direction of the 
organization's work between meetings of the Council. A 
permanent Secretary, N. Fadeev of the USSR, controls a 
staff of experts and advisers drawn from the member states. 
In 1956 permanent Commissions, specializing in particular 
sectors of the economy, were established in the member 
states, located in countries where interest in the sector in 
question is particularly strong (e.g. agriculture in Sofia, 
chemicals in East Berlin, coal in Warsaw, machine-building 
in Prague). The Commissions which deal with major ques-
tions of common concern-electrical energy, foreign trade, 
economic problems, uses of atomic energy, co-ordination 
of research, statistics and foreign exchange-are in Moscow. 
For so large an area the permanent staff is comparatively 
small, perhaps no more than a third of the number 
employed by the EEC in Brussels. The layout of the 
organization tends to emphasize the presence of the one 
very large Power in its midst, for while the headquarters of 
the EEC is in Belgium, one of the smaller of the EEC 
states, the headquarters of Comecon and an important part 
of its institutions are in the USSR. 
The powers of the central institutions of Comecon over 
the member states are limited not only by the composition 
of the Council but also by Article IV of the Statutes which 
lays down that (a) the recommendations adopted by the 
member countries of the Council shall be implemented by 
the governments in accordance with national legislation and 
(b) the effects of recommendations and decisions shall not 
extend to countries which have declared their lack of 
interest in a matter considered by the Council. The weak-
ness of the Council's authority has had contrary effects. 
In the first place although no single country can exercize 
a veto in the Council, it can prevent any recommendation 
from being uniformly applied throughout the area. 
Secondly, the single most powerful member of the Council 
cannot "constitutionally" use the Council to impose a 
decision on another member. Thirdly, it is extremely 
difficult for those in Eastern Europe who wish to see the 
area more closely integrated (as distinct from more co-
operative) to use the machinery of the Council for this 
purpose. 
Development 
1945-1956 
In the period from 1945 to 1949 when the USSR was 
establishing the regimes in Eastern Europe which gave it 
effective political and military control of the area there 
was no plan to integrate their economies on the lines 
adopted by the EEC. In many ways Eastern Europe was 
cut off from the rest of the world and developed methods 
in economic planning and foreign trade which gave it a 
1 See insert. 
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unique and exclusive character of its own. As a result of 
this isolation it was natural that the countries of Eastern 
Europe should trade with each other much more than w~th 
the outside world. On the other hand each country tned 
to reconstruct its economy and to hasten the process of 
industrialization in accordance with its own national plans, 
and this led to a high degree of national self-sufficiency or 
autarky. 
In the first period of Comecon's existence, which 
coincided with the last years of Stalin's life, the organiza-
tion smaller and weaker than it is today, could do virtually 
nothlng to influence economic developments in Eastern 
Europe except to try to co-ordinate the lists of commodities 
to be exchanged between the member states. Apart from a 
meeting in Sofia in November 1950 to discuss inter-regional 
trade no meeting of the Council took place between the 
end of 1949 and the spring of 1954. Not only was no 
progress made in regional planning in this period: under 
pressure from the USSR the economies of the states became 
even more distorted by the priority given to heavy industry. 
With the death of Stalin and the ending of the Korean 
War in 1953 there was a widespread reaction in Eastern 
Europe against the hardships endured by the ordinary 
consumer. A new phase began. Now for the first time 
consideration could be given to the supply of consumer 
goods and the rationalization of production in order to 
reduce costs. The Council of Comecon awoke from its 
long sleep and began to meet more frequently, discussing 
the construction of a unified electricity grid, encouraging 
the member states to conclude long-term trade agreements 
with each other and beginning to get to grips with the idea, 
which was to prove very troublesome later on, that there 
should be specialization in production as between the 
member states. 
1956-1962 
In 1956, undoubtedly spurred on by the progress of 
negotiations for economic integration in Western Europe 
the institutional structure of Comecon was at last strength-
ened and the first twelve standing commissions were 
established. Serious discussion of the plan to specialize 
production by country did not begin until 1957-1958. Here 
the Council met with disappointment because many of the 
states were reluctant to agree to specialization as it might 
involve the dis-continuance of industrial activities in a 
particular member state and their transfer elsewhere. In 
fact very little was achieved. Dissatisfied with progress the 
Party leaders of the member states met in Moscow in 
May 1958 and agreed that the economies of the member 
states should be reorganized and their national plans co-
ordinated. The most important practical effect of the 
meeting was not so much a fundamental change in orga-
nization as a major investment boom which affected all the 
member states but left relations between them largely 
unchanged. It did not secure closer integration. 
Challenged by the rapid progress of the EEC in its early 
years the Party leaders of the Comecon states subjected 
their own system, which was evincing all the signs of 
stagnation, to a searching analysis in 1962. This time 
Mr. Krushchev put forward an ill-prepared scheme for a 
central planning institution for the whole of Comecon which 
would in effect have imposed the long-sought-for specializa-
tion among the member states by authoritarian direction. 
To achieve such a centralized system it would have been 
necessary to alter the Statutes and give the organization an 
entirely new status. In fact discussion did not reach that 
stage for the Rumanians, fearing with considerable justice 
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that the scheme would halt their own industrialization and 
condemn them to supplying food and raw materials, went 
into opposition and have ever since been implacable 
opponents of central planning and even of closer integration 
in the organization. Though less outspoken than the 
Rumanians other Comecon states dislike the idea of central 
planning for the whole area, chiefly on the grounds that 
its supranational character would imperil such national 
independence as they have been able to preserve within the 
"socialist commonwealth". There are still some Russian 
theorists and officials who advocate a comprehensive plan 
in the longer term but the Soviet Government has been 
very cautious in its official pronouncements on the issue 
since 1962 and has hesitated to give a strong lead. 
Economic reform in Eastern Europe 
Opinions on the subject of integration have become more 
complex and diverse since the movement for reform of the 
management of the national economies began to take shape 
in Eastern Europe in the early sixties. Beginning in East 
Germany in 1963, extending through Poland and the USSR 
in 1965, launched in Czechoslovakia in 1966, cautiously 
applied in Rumania in 1967 and culminating in its most 
advanced exemplar in Hungary in 1968 the movement seeks 
to resolve the difficulties of central planning in what are 
now industrial societies by a limited decentralization of 
economic decision-making. While all the states retain the 
concept of the central national plan they all now devolve, 
in varying degrees, some of the responsibility for decision-
making to industrial associations and enterprises and all 
accept, in varying degrees, the management of the economy 
by such means as the control of credit as a partial substitute 
for the detailed direction of the economy by means of strict 
quantitative prescription from the central planning autho-
ntles. In most cases. and in varying degrees, cautious 
experiments are being made with the use of prices and 
differentials in earnings as a means of adjusting supply to 
demand and stimulating initiative. 
Comecon as such plays no part in the reforms which, 
although they share a good deal of common ground 
throughout the area, are being implemented in strikingly 
different ways as between one country and another 
according to national requirements. Although restrained 
by the fate of Czechoslovakia, where economic reform was 
associated with a political ferment crushed in August 1968 
by the USSR as an intolerable deviation from the norm, 
the Comecon states have developed systems of management 
which have heightened diversity rather than uniformity 
within the organization. The problem of integration has 
become correspondingly more complex. 
Trade 
The member states do a large part of their foreign trade 
with each other 1. The levels of trade are planned by the 
national states (with some intervention from the central 
Comecon institutions) and incorporated in bilateral trade 
agreements. Together with participation in joint projects 
such as the electricity grid, some joint production arrange-
ments between enterprises and the exchange of technical 
information these agreements are the principal instruments 
for the integration-such as it is-of the area. It is a 
laborious and unsatisfactory method, widely criticized in 
Eastern Europe for its failure to promote the free flow of 
' See table, page 4. 
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commodities, capital and labour, its failure to promote the 
grouping of enterprises to obtain the advantages of large 
scale production and therefore the progress of industrial 
efficiency and its failure to secure a rational system of 
prices upon which calculations can be made. The monetary 
system, based on artificial exchange rates and a method of 
accounting in inconvertible roubles carried out through the 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation hampers not 
only the development of trade within the area but also its 
relations with the rest of the world economy 2. Given this 
legacy from the past and the institutional weakness of 
Comecon, the diversity in levels of economic development, 
the differences in methods of economic management, the 
universal tendency towards greater decentralization in the 
national economies and the general desire of the non-
Russian members to safeguard a degree of national inde-
pendence, it is small wonder that a consensus as to the 
replacement of the present Comecon system by a new and 
more closely integrated one is hard to find. 
Comecon future 
Most members of Comecon accept the necessity for 
reform. They see the advantages of scale and technical 
progress which might flow from a better system of regional 
integration. But how are they to be obtained? To 
conceive of the area as a single planned economy is to go 
back on the principles of the contemporary reforms and to 
invite political trouble. To conceive of it, as some East 
European thinkers do, as a potential single market is to go 
beyond the scope of the national reforms as at present 
operating and, by inviting still more radical changes in the 
system of economic management, challenge the basis of 
socialist planning in the member states themselves. The 
search for a way of escape from this dilemma is giving rise 
to intense discussion. The member states tend, on grounds 
of general principle and of national interest, to proffer 
divergent solutions which at one extreme favour the idea 
of a common market and at the other either the status quo 
or a more closely integrated technological community. The 
problem is so inherently difficult that the last "summit" 
meeting of party and government leaders in April 1969 
produced almost no result The debate will be protracted; 
decisions as and when they are reached will be of major 
importance not only for the future of Comecon but also 
for the relationships between its member states and the rest 
of the world. 
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Table 1 Comecon's trade 1958 aod JJ68 
Imports Exports 
1958 I % I 1968 I % 1958 I % I 1968 I % $m Sm $m $m 
USSR 
Total 4,350 100 9,410 100 4,298 100 10,634 100 
From/to 
EEC 222 5.1 908 9.6 271 6.3 758 7.1 
UK 73 1.7 273 3.0 146 3.4 367 3.4 
Other Comecon a 2,206 50.7 5,697 60.0 2,320 54.0 5,830 53.0 
East Germany 
Total 1,680 100 3,387 100 1,890 100 3,783 100 
From/to 
EEC 250 14.9 396 11.7 252 13.3 465 12.3 
(Of which: 
W. Germany) 190 11.3 289 8.6 211 11.2 331 8.8 
UK 33 2.0 38 1.1 12 0.6 31 0.8 
Other Comecon a 1,055 62.8 2,426 71.5 1,229 65.0 2,708 71.4 
Poland 
Total 1,227 100 2,853 100 1,059 100 2,858 100 
From/to 
138 EEC 11.2 363 12.7 120 11.3 293 10.3 
UK 83 6.8 175 6.1 69 6.5 147 5.1 
Other Comecon a 651 53.0 1,749 61.1 508 47.9 1,760 61.4 
Czechoslovakia 
Total 1,357 100 3,077 100 1,513 100 3,005 100 
From/to 
122 9.0 289 9.4 7.3 9.6 EEC 110 290 
UK 32 2.4 80 2.6 29 1.9 80 2.7 
Other Comecon a 844 62.2 2,083 67.5 910 60.2 1,944 64.4 
Hungary 
Total 631 100 1,803 100 684 100 1,789 100 
From/to 
EEC 73 11.6 220 12.2 75 11.0 200 11.2 
UK 20 3.2 52 2.9 12 1.8 42 2.3 
Other Comecon a 399 63.3 1,189 65.9 388 56.8 1,214 67.5 
Roumania 
Total 482 100 1,609 100 468 100 1,469 100 
From/to 
EEC 51 10.6 423 26.3 56 11.9 255 17.4 
UK 7 1.5 101 6.3 7 1.5 56 3.8 
Other Comecon a 361 74.8 741 46.0 322 68.8 767 52.1 
Bulgaria 
Total 367 100 1,782 100 373 100 1,615 100 
From/to 
30 8.1 196 11.0 EEC 25 6.7 126 7.8 
UK 3 0.8 21 1.2 3 0.8 27 1.7 
Other Comecon a 302 82.2 1,301 72.9 306 81.8 1,211 74.9 
Comecon 
Total 10,172 100 23,921 100 10,315 100 25,153 100 
From/to 
EEC 888 8.8 2,794 11.7 910 8.8 2,387 9.5 
UK 252 2.5 739 3.1 277 2.7 749 3.0 
Other Comecon a 5,891 57.9 15,187 63.5 6,060 57.7 15,433 60.5 
a Not including Albania, Mongolia. 
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